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ABSTRACT 
One prominent justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that 
define modern securities law is that these rules encourage individual 
investors to participate in stock markets. Mandatory disclosure, the theory 
goes, gives individual investors access to information that puts them on a 
more equal playing field with sophisticated institutional shareholders. 
Although this reasoning has long been cited by regulators and 
commentators as a basis for mandating disclosure, recent work has 
questioned its validity. In particular, recent studies contend that individual 
investors are overwhelmed by the amount of information required to be 
disclosed under current law, and thus they cannot—and do not—use that 
information to analyze the companies that they own.  
Using a recent change in the law that allows firms to disclose less 
information before their initial public offering (“IPO”), we examine 
whether reduced disclosure leads to less trading by individual investors. 
Our results show that, immediately following the IPO, individual investors 
are less likely to trade in the stocks of the firms that provide less 
disclosure—but that this difference disappears after two weeks of trading. 
Our findings have important implications for the lawmakers now 
examining whether, and how, to change the mandatory disclosure rules 
that have served as the basis of federal securities law for generations.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory disclosure is the cornerstone of federal securities law.
1
 One 
oft-cited justification for requiring disclosure
2
 is that it is necessary to 
provide individual investors with equal access to securities markets.
3
 But 
whether the mandatory disclosure rules we have today actually achieve 
this goal is theoretically ambiguous and hotly debated. Some argue that 
disclosure facilitates individual investor participation in securities markets 
by reducing information asymmetry among different types of investors—
that is, by leveling the playing field between sophisticated institutional 
shareholders and invididual investors.
4
 More recent work, however, has 
suggested that individual investors suffer from “disclosure overload”—and 
that increasing the amount of information disclosed under federal 
securities law does not benefit these investors, who are unable to extract 
relevant information from increasingly complicated securities filings.
5
 But 
 
 
 1. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that all companies register non-exempt securities prior to 
their sale, a process that requires the company to disclose significant information about its financial 
performance and governance for the years preceding the sale. After the firm has provided this 
information and sells its securities, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 then requires ongoing, 
periodic disclosures relating to the firm’s financial performance and governance. See generally 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–mm (2014); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–pp (2014). 
 2. For the seminal work describing the economic basis for a system of mandatory disclosure, 
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 
70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
 3. See, e.g., Michael H. Sutton, Financial Reporting in U.S. Capital Markets: International 
Dimensions, 11 ACCT. HORIZONS 96 (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., Brian J. Bushee et al., Open Versus Closed Conference Calls: The Determinants 
and Effects of Broadening Access to Disclosure, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 149 (2003); Bevis Longstreth, 
Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Eighth AICPA National Conference for CPAs in 
Industry: The SEC’s Role in Financial Disclosure (Apr. 29, 1983), available at https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/1983/042983longstreth.pdf. 
 5. See, e.g., Alastair Lawrence, Individual Investors and Financial Disclosure, 56 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 130 (2013) (showing that individuals are more likely to invest in, and to earn higher returns 
from, firms with clearer and more concise disclosures); Brian P. Miller, The Effects of Reporting 
Complexity on Small and Large Investor Trading, 85 ACCT. REV. 2107 (2010) (finding that individuals 
are less likely to trade in companies with complex disclosures). In light of these concerns about 
“disclosure overload,” in 2013, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a lengthy 
report reviewing the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure rules in the United States. U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K (2013) 
[hereinafter SEC REPORT]. And the SEC has since announced a rulemaking project to reform the rules 
governing mandatory disclosures for US public firms, see Keith F. Higgins, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Disclosure Effectiveness: Remarks Before the American Bar Association 
Business Law Section Spring Meeting (Apr. 11, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/ 
Detail/Speech/1370541479332, and issued a concept release raising more than 300 questions regarding 
how any such reform should proceed, see Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure 
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there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on whether and how the 
quantum of information required to be disclosed under federal securities 
law actually affects individual investor participation in securities markets.
6
 
In this Article, we provide evidence on the effects of disclosure on 
individual investors from a unique setting provided by a recent law: the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”).7 The JOBS 
Act allows certain firms conducting an initial public offering (“IPO”) to 
provide fewer disclosures to investors.
8
 This setting allows us to provide 
unique insights into the relationship between mandatory disclosure rules 
and individual investor participation for two reasons. First, most firms that 
conduct an IPO after the passage of the JOBS Act are allowed to provide 
reduced disclosure in one or more different areas in which disclosure is 
typically mandated;
9
 this provides variation that allows us to study how 
individual investors respond to varying levels of disclosure. Second, 
because investors generally have limited information about firms before an 
IPO, disclosure is especially relevant to investors at the IPO stage.
10
 Thus, 
our setting provides a unique opportunity to test the importance of 
mandatory securities disclosures to individual investors at a time when 
securities law is an important source of information—indeed, sometimes 
the only source of information—for those investors. 
Our evidence shows that reducing the information that firms are 
required to disclose before an IPO leads to a statistically and economically 
significant decrease in individual investor participation in the IPO. 
Importantly, however, this effect is substantially reduced during the week 
of trading following the IPO—and disappears completely after two weeks. 
Our findings are consistent with theory predicting that individual investors 
who are at an informational disadvantage to other investors will be less 
likely to participate in securities markets. But our evidence also shows 
 
 
Required by Regulation S-K, Exchange Act Release No. 33-10064 (Apr. 13, 2016), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf. 
 6. For rare exceptions, see generally, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 5; Miller, supra note 5. 
 7. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
 8. Id. § 102.  
 9. See, e.g., id. § 102(b)(1)(A) (permitting an “emerging growth company” to present only two, 
rather than three, years of audited financial statements in its IPO registration statement).  
 10. Individual investors are thought to be at an especially significant information disadvantage 
prior to the IPO because, among other reasons, Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Regulation FD”) does not 
apply to firms that are not yet public. See infra Part I.B. Regulation FD is an SEC rule designed to 
prevent selective disclosure—that is, to prevent firms from providing information to a select group of 
favored investors instead of making the information available to the public at large. Under Regulation 
FD, when a company discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities, like 
stock analysts, the company must make the information publicly available to all potential investors. 
See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2015). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
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that, while this disadvantage can be addressed by mandating disclosure, 
such mandates are not the only mechanism available to address these 
information asymmetries.
11
  
Our findings have important implications for the regulators now 
considering the costs and benefits of proposed changes to the disclosures 
currently mandated by federal securities law.
12
 In particular, the evidence 
indicates that policymakers concerned about the effects of such changes on 
individual investors might turn their focus to firms that are already 
public—rather than firms at the IPO stage, where the effects of reduced 
disclosures are likely to be largest for individual investors. Our findings 
also suggest that lawmakers should emphasize experimental approaches to 
modifying the law in this area—as the SEC has done in the past—so that 
regulators and researchers can better understand the effects of these 
changes on investors of all kinds.  
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides 
theoretical background on the relationship between mandatory disclosure 
rules and individual investors’ participation in stock markets. Part II 
provides empirical evidence that individual investors participate less in the 
IPOs of firms that disclose less under the JOBS Act—but that this effect 
disappears during the two weeks of trading that follow the offering. Part 
III describes the implications of our findings for lawmakers and 
commentators. Part IV concludes. 
I. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 
Ever since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, commentators have offered myriad justifications 
for the federal laws that require public corporations to disclose certain 
information to investors.
13
 In this Article, we study one frequently cited 
 
 
 11. See Longstreth, supra note 4, at 7.  
 12. See Higgins, supra note 5 (discussing the SEC’s current efforts to revise the current 
disclosure requirements in order to make securities filings more effective); see also Concept Release 
on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the 
Commission is currently “assess[ing] whether [its disclosure rules] continue to provide the information 
that investors need to make informed investment and voting decisions and whether any of [the SEC’s] 
rules have become outdated or unnecessary”). 
 13. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 2 (arguing that mandatory disclosure is necessary for capital 
markets to function efficiently, since the benefits of disclosure are diffuse, but the costs are borne by 
the firm, so that firms will not provide the efficient level of disclosure without regulation); see also 
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 
1051 (1995) (arguing that mandatory disclosure rules reduce agency costs by giving investors the 
information they need to “police” firm management). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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justification for mandatory disclosure laws: that mandatory disclosure is 
beneficial because it entices individual investors to participate in securities 
markets.  
This claim has been hotly debated for decades, with commentators 
emphasizing two objections. First, observers dispute whether individual 
investors should be encouraged to participate in equities markets at all. As 
we explain in Part I.A below, some have argued forcefully that social 
welfare might be enhanced by excluding—or at least discouraging—
individual investors from participating in stock markets. Despite these 
arguments, however, securities regulators today emphasize invididual 
investor participation as an important policy objective of modern securities 
law.
14
 
Because regulators continue to pursue mechanisms for encouraging 
individual investors to participate in stock markets, in Part I.B we consider 
whether, in fact, providing individuals with more information about public 
companies encourages them to invest. Significant recent work has 
questioned that notion, arguing that, because individuals are unable to 
process the overwhelming quantum of information provided in modern 
securities disclosures, mandatory disclosure rules likely have little effect 
on individual investor participation in markets. As we explain below, 
although some previous work has attempted to examine that claim 
empirically, in this Article we use a rare setting to evaluate the relationship 
between mandatory disclosure and individual investor participation in 
modern stock markets. 
A. The Optimal Role of Individual Investors in Modern Stock Markets 
Virtually since the conception of the modern federal securities 
regulation apparatus, policymakers have argued that the protection of 
individual investors should be among its principal goals.
15
 The legislative 
history of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts themselves suggest that Congress 
 
 
 14. See, e.g., Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Protecting the Retail Investor 
(Mar. 24, 2014), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541226174 (“The 
retail investor must be a constant focus of the SEC—if we fail to serve and safeguard the retail 
investor, we have not fulfilled our mission.”).  
 15. For a discussion of this issue in two of the Nation’s leading securities casebooks, see 
STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 12 (2d ed. 2008) (“At various points 
[throughout securities law], we . . . see regulatory schemes intended to protect ordinary small investors 
from the big players.”); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 2 (12th 
ed. 2012) (“Historically, the securities markets have long been thought to be affected with a special 
public interest.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
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intended both statutes to serve that objective.
16
 Nor is the notion 
antiquated. Current SEC Chair Mary Jo White has frequently worried that 
today’s securities regulation regime may not give individual investors 
sufficient protection.
17
 
Recent scholarship, however, has argued forcefully that individual 
investor protection should not be the central goal of securities regulation. 
For example, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky have persuasively 
argued that the objective of securities law should be to maximize social 
welfare, and that to do so, lawmakers should design securities regulation 
for sophisticated institutional investors rather than individuals.
18
 More 
recently, finance scholar Luigi Zingales has suggested that regulators 
should discourage individual investors from participating in securities 
markets because protecting this relatively small group of unsophisticated 
investors causes a significant increase in regulatory costs—without 
offsetting social-welfare benefits.
19
 
By contrast, some commentators have urged that individual investor 
participation produces significant efficiency benefits. For example, a 
group of economists recently argued that individual traders enhance 
market efficiency by providing an important source of liquidity.
20
 Indeed, 
there is significant empirical evidence that individual investors are 
contrarian—that is, that they tend to invest against the tide of general 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933) (surveying the decade of securities activity that 
followed World War I and concluding that the stock market volatility that occurred during that decade 
“spelle[d] tragedy in the lives of thousands of individuals who invested their life savings, accumulated 
after years of effort, in . . . worthless securities”). 
 17. See, e.g., Interview by Steven Bochner, Chair, Sec. Regulation Inst., with Mary Jo White, 
Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 26, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
securities-regulation-institute-keynote-white.html (noting that invididual investors, when it comes to 
IPOs, “may get very excited from an article or a blog and invest their money, and so you worry about 
them not getting sufficient or accurate information”). 
 18. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (arguing, based on a theoretical market model, that securities 
laws would be most efficient if they were designed for sophisticated institutional investors); see also 
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 14 
(1979) (“[T]he SEC overestimates the average investor’s ability to master the complexities of the 
financial picture of the typical issuer . . . and therefore has failed . . . to understand that its disclosure 
documents can be used effectively only by professionals.”). 
 19. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 391, 417 (2009) 
(suggesting that individual investors should be nudged out of equities markets so that securities laws 
can be designed for efficiency rather than investor protection). 
 20. See, e.g., Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Stock Returns, 63 J. FIN. 273, 
274 (2008) (“[T]he contrarian tendency of individuals leads them to act as liquidity providers to 
institutions that require immediacy.”); Qin Wang & Jun Zhang, Individual Investor Trading and Stock 
Liquidity, 45 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 485, 486 (2015) (“We find striking evidence that 
individual investor trading has a significantly positive effect on stock liquidity.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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market movements. These contrarian tendiences, some have argued, play 
an important role in market dynamics: because individual investors often 
take the other side of large institutions’ trades, they significantly improve 
liquidity.
21
  
Despite the decades-long academic debate over whether securities law 
should seek to encourage individual investors to participate in securities 
markets, policymakers today consistently contend that doing so is among 
their principal regulatory objectives.
22
 Thus, in the next Part, we turn to a 
second question: how the law can best encourage individuals to invest in 
securities markets. In particular, we examine current debates over whether 
mandatory disclosure rules do, in fact, encourage individual investors to 
participate in today’s stock markets. 
B. Individual Investors and Mandatory Disclosure 
The claim that mandatory disclosure rules encourage individuals to 
invest in securities markets rests on the premise that such rules “level the 
playing field” between individuals and more sophisticated retail investors. 
Individual investors, the theory goes, benefit more from mandatory 
disclosure than institutional players because, while more sophisticated 
investors might have other sources of information about a firm, individual 
investors must rely upon securities filings for details about the firms that 
they own. More recent work, however, has argued that modern securities 
filings include such an overwhelming amount of information that 
mandating more disclosure is unlikely to encourage individuals to invest. 
Instead, under this competing view, individual investors are likely to be 
overwhelmed by the volume of information in modern securities 
disclosures and, thus, will not use that information in making their 
investment decisions.  
1. Disclosure and “Leveling the Playing Field” 
For decades, the SEC has argued that extensive mandatory disclosure 
rules are necessary to entice individual investors to participate in securities 
markets. In 1983, for example, one Commissioner famously remarked that 
“[m]andatory disclosure fosters investor confidence by ensuring all 
 
 
 21. See, e.g., John M. Griffin et. al., The Dynamics of Institutional and Individual Trading, 58 J. 
FIN. 2285 (2003); Mark Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, The Investment Behavior and Performance of 
Various Investor Types: A Study of Finland’s Unique Data Set, 55 J. FIN. ECON. 43 (2000); Mark 
Grinblatt & Matti Keloharju, What Makes Investors Trade?, 56 J. FIN. 589 (2001). 
 22. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
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investors of equal access to corporate information,” noting that “[i]nvestor 
confidence comes from the knowledge that the information is equally 
available to all—large and small.”
23
 
The intuition for why mandatory disclosure spurs participation by 
individual investors is twofold. First, because investors are more likely to 
participate when they know more about a company, securities disclosures 
are a way to ensure that individuals receive information about public 
firms. Although institutional investors have access to the disclosures as 
well, the information may provide a particular benefit to individuals, 
because large institutions generally have access to other sources of 
information.  
Second, even if individuals do not learn more about public companies 
from mandatory disclosures than they otherwise might, previous work has 
shown that individual investors are more likely to participate in markets 
when they are assured that they have equal access to information. The 
reason is intuitive: if a more informed investor is willing to buy (or sell) a 
security at a given price, a relatively uninformed investor taking the other 
side of that trade can rationally conclude that the price she is paying to sell 
(or buy) the security may be a losing proposition.
24
  
Longstanding empirical work provides significant support for the idea 
that more disclosure encourages individuals to participate in securities 
markets. For example, one study found that the companies that hold “open 
conference calls”—meaning that all investors, as opposed to only a subset 
of investors or only financial analysts, are allowed to participate in the 
conference call—have greater levels of individual investors.
25
 Notably, 
substantial evidence also indicates that equal access to information, rather 
than merely more information, drives participation. For example, 
individual participation increased after Regulation FD—the SEC 
regulation intended to reduce information asymmetry among different 
types of investors—went into effect.
26
 Importantly, the increase in 
 
 
 23. See Longstreth, supra note 4, at 7. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Bushee et al., supra note 4, at 177–78. 
 26. See Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana et al., The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on 
Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis, 39 FIN. REV. 549 (2004); see also 
Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: 
Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research 24–25 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 
No. 306/2016, 2015), available at http://research.chicagobooth.edu/~/media/7628D551E7424DC085 
24879103870C12.pdf (describing empirical evidence demonstrating that increased corporate 
disclosure can mitigate information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors by 
reducing the opportunities for investors to become privately informed). For a discussion of Regulation 
FD, see supra note 10. 
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individual participation was attributable to the fact that information was 
now available to all investors equally, not to an increase in the total 
amount of information available.
27
  
We note that the risk that individual investors will be less informed 
than large institutions is particularly pronounced at the IPO stage—the 
setting we study here. The reason is that Regulation FD does not apply 
prior to the IPO, thus allowing management to disclose information to 
institutional investors that is not publicly available.
28
 The risk that 
individual investors face in this context was powerfully demonstrated in 
the aftermath of Facebook’s recent IPO. Following disappointing returns 
on the first few days of trading, it was revealed that Facebook’s 
management informed financial analysts prior to the IPO that future 
earnings were expected to be less robust than originally predicted. 
However, only select clients such as financial analysts—and not the 
general public—were informed of the update.
29
 While Regulation FD 
would have prohibited such selective disclosure if it had applied, 
Facebook disclosed the information prior to the IPO, and its disclosures 
thus fell outside the scope of Regulation FD.  
2. Disclosure and “Information Overload” 
Notwithstanding substantial evidence that increasing the level of 
disclosure will enhance individual investor participation in stock markets, 
other work has argued that more disclosure will discourage individuals 
from investing. The reason is that today’s securities disclosures arguably 
provide too much detail on public companies, making it impossible for 
individual investors, with limited analytical resources, to make meaningful 
use of the disclosed information. 
Significant psychology research has shown that when individuals are 
presented with extensive information about a particular decision, they 
become more likely to rely on heuristics than systematic evaluation, 
decreasing the quality of information processing—and decisions.
30
 
 
 
 27. See Chiyachantana et al., supra note 26, at 560. 
 28. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,725 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (“[W]ith limited exceptions, Regulation FD as adopted does 
not apply to disclosures made in connection with a securities offering registered under the Securities 
Act.”).  
 29. See Shayndi Raice et al., Inside Fumbled Facebook Offering, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2012, 
11:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304019404577420660698374718.  
 30. See generally JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER (1993); John W. 
Payne, Contingent Decision Behavior, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 382 (1982); John W. Payne et al., Adaptive 
Strategy Selection in Decision Making, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 534 (1988). For important 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
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Consistent with that notion, studies on individual investors and financial 
disclosures have suggested that individuals may be unable to effectively 
process the information public companies provide under today’s securities 
laws; for example, empirical work has suggested that individuals are less 
likely to invest in firms with greater financial complexity.
31
  
Indeed, some recent work goes even further, arguing that more 
extensive mandatory disclosure rules disadvantage individual investors 
because of the greater information-processing capabilities of institutional 
shareholders.
32
 Empirical work has shown that institutional investors are 
better able to process financial disclosures than individual shareholders,
33
 
raising the possibility that mandatory disclosure rules provide a 
disproportionate benefit to certain sophisticated investors. Because these 
sophisticated investors are better able to interpret the information provided 
under mandatory disclosure rules, the argument goes, these rules have the 
unintended consequence of increasing information asymmetry between 
institutional investors and individual shareholders.
34
  
These concerns have led commentators and lawmakers alike to wonder 
whether existing disclosure rules disadvantage individual investors by 
requiring firms to provide an overwhelming amount of information in 
securities filings. For example, former SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes 
has argued in these pages that today’s mandatory disclosure rules may be 
counterproductive, leading investors who are overwhelmed with 
information to make worse investment decisions than they otherwise 
might.
35
 And the SEC’s own recent study of its mandatory disclosure rules 
repeatedly suggested that some disclosure requirements have produced 
 
 
recent work describing the implications of these insights for disclosures mandated throughout the law, 
see OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE 
OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure 
Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015). 
 31. See Miller, supra note 5, at 2107. 
 32. See, e.g., Charles M. C. Lee et al., Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of Earnings Information: 
An Intraday Analysis, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 345 (1993). Additional information can also exacerbate 
information asymmetry if the additional information complements the information set held by some—
but not all—investors. 
 33. See, e.g., Alan Guoming Huang et al., Institutional Trading Around Corporate News: 
Evidence from Textual Analysis (May 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2336069. 
 34. See Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 172 (2001) 
(describing instances in which greater disclosure may exacerbate information asymmetry among 
investors). 
 35. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for 
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003). 
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“lengthy, technical disclosure[s]” that are not useful to individual 
investors.
36
  
The more general debate over whether the law should encourage 
individual investor participation in markets is unlikely to be amenable to 
systematic empirical analysis.
37
 However, the competing hypotheses 
described above about how mandatory disclosure rules affect individual 
investor behavior are empirically testable. On the one hand, if these rules 
benefit individual investors, we would predict that a decrease in the 
quantum of disclosure required by the law would lead to less individual 
investor participation in markets. On the other, if individuals do indeed 
suffer from “disclosure overload,” we would expect that a decrease in the 
information required to be disclosed under securities law would have no 
effect—or might even increase—individuals’ willingness to invest. In the 
next Part, we provide the first empirical evidence testing these competing 
theoretical predictions. 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
As explained in Part I, lawmakers are now debating how the law can 
best facilitate individual investor participation in modern markets—and, in 
particular, mandatory disclosure rules as a policy mechanism for doing so. 
Would increasing the required disclosures under federal securities law 
overwhelm individual investors, leading them to exit stock markets? Or 
would requiring more information in securities filings assure individuals 
that they are on a level playing field with more savvy institutional players, 
enhancing individual investor participation? In this Article, we use 
evidence from the recent passage of the JOBS Act to provide the first-ever 
empirical study of these questions. 
The evidence shows that the reduction in mandatory disclosure that 
occurred under the JOBS Act led to a reduction in trading by individual 
investors, suggesting that individuals prefer to receive more information 
under these disclosures rather than less.
38
 Importantly, however, the data 
 
 
 36. See SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 101. In fact, the Director of the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance—which oversees, among other things, many of the SEC’s disclosure mandates—
recently stated that the division is reconsidering those rules in light of the “growing concern about 
disclosure overload” that may lead “an individual investor [to] feel overloaded—and a bit 
overwhelmed—with information.” Higgins, supra note 5. 
 37. See, e.g., Zingales, supra note 19 (noting that preventing individual investor participation in 
securities markets would have the distinct disadvantage of making measuring the social-welfare effects 
of such participation methodologically infeasible). 
 38. See infra Part II.E. 
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also indicate that these differences in individual investor trading disappear 
relatively quickly after the company’s IPO—within two weeks.39 Thus, 
our findings suggest that, while a decrease in mandatory disclosure might 
initially reduce individual investor participation—particularly at the IPO 
stage—other information-generating activities, such as active trading of 
the company’s stock, might entice individuals to continue to invest in 
public companies. 
A. The JOBS Act 
The JOBS Act was signed into law on April 5, 2012, with the stated 
purpose of increasing “American job creation and economic growth by 
improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.”
40
 Specifically, Congress intended to provide smaller, growing 
companies with cheaper access to capital.
41
 To reduce the costs associated 
with IPOs, the Act created a new class of companies, Emerging Growth 
Companies (“EGCs”), which may provide reduced disclosures in their 
securities filings in connection with their IPOs.
42
 The primary requirement 
for qualifying as an EGC is that the company must have less than $1 
billion in total revenue in its most recently completed fiscal year.
43
 
1. Reductions in Disclosure Available to EGCs 
Provided that they do not lose their EGC status, EGCs may provide 
reduced disclosure for the first five years following their IPO.
44
 These 
reduced disclosures typically relate to one of four areas of the firm’s 
finances and governance.
45
 First, EGCs may choose to provide two (rather 
than three) years of historical audited financial data.
46
 Second, EGCs are 
not required to produce the internal controls report required by Section 
 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, pmbl., 126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012). 
 41. Indeed, Congress’s intent is demonstrated by the name of Title II of the JOBS Act: “Access 
to Capital for Job Creators.” Id. § 201. 
 42. See id. § 102. 
 43. See id. § 101(a). 
 44. See id. 
 45. For a discussion of all reduced disclosures available to EGCs, see id. § 102. For more detail, 
see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STARTUPS ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfjjobsactfaq-title-i-general.htm (last modified 
Dec. 21, 2015) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS]. 
 46. JOBS Act § 102(b)(1)(A); see also FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 45. 
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404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
47
 Section 404 requires that 
management and an outside auditor provide an assessment of the firm’s 
internal controls in a special report.
48
 Third, EGCs can elect to provide 
less disclosure regarding their executives’ pay; specifically, they can 
disclose historical compensation data for three (rather than five) 
executives for the previous two (rather than three) years.
49
  
Finally, EGCs can choose to pursue a “confidential” IPO process, in 
which the company privately submits its registration statement to the SEC 
instead of filing it publicly.
50
 In a non-confidential filing, potential 
investors can view the registration statement as soon as the company has 
filed it, and can view the back-and-forth process between the SEC and the 
company, which can reveal important information.
51
 In a confidential 
filing, the draft registration statements are instead released as exhibits to 
the final registration statement when it is made publicly available.
52
 From 
the company’s perspective, a confidential filing is beneficial because it 
allows the company to have more control over the timing of its IPO 
announcement—a crucial component of IPO success.
53
 
2. Previous Work on the JOBS Act 
Prior literature on the JOBS Act has largely focused on whether the Act 
has, in fact, reduced the costs of going public for the EGCs that took 
 
 
 47. JOBS Act § 103. 
 48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The implementation of Section 404 is associated with 
increased reliability of reported financials and fewer intentional misstatements. See Ziv Singer & 
Haifeng You, The Effect of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Earnings Quality, 26 J. ACCT., 
AUDITING & FIN. 556 (2011). However, it has also increased audit fees significantly, particularly for 
smaller firms. See Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock 
Prices, 65 J. FIN. 1163, 1166 (2010). 
 49. JOBS Act § 102(a). These disclosures are required by 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. 
 50. JOBS Act § 106. All securities filings made in connection with the company’s registration 
statement must be made public no later than twenty-one days prior to the company’s “road show.” A 
“road show” is when the company’s managers and financial advisors present the company to potential 
buyers in order to generate interest in the company’s securities. See Conditions to Permissible Post-
Filing Free Writing Prospectuses, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2016). 
 51. For example, the SEC forced Groupon to revise its initial registration statement because it 
used non-standard accounting principles. Upon completion of all revisions, total revenues in the first 
half of 2011 decreased from roughly $1.5 billion to $688 million. See Alexia Tsotsis, Groupon IPO 
Shares Pop 40% on First Trade, Debuts at $28 with a $17.8B Market Cap, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 4, 
2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/04/groupon-ipo-shares-pop-40-on-first-trade-debuts-at-17-8b-
market-cap/. 
 52. JOBS Act § 106(a); see also infra note 63 (describing how these filings can be obtained). 
 53. See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving Money on 
the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413, 433–37 (2002). 
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advantage of the reduced disclosures allowed under the Act. While several 
studies have so far found that the Act had no effect on the direct costs of 
going public—like underwriter, legal, and accounting fees
54
—several 
studies have found that the JOBS Act has increased the indirect costs of 
going public. For example, recent work shows that, relative to comparable 
non-EGC firms, EGCs suffer greater IPO underpricing
55
 and stock-price 
volatility in the period following the IPO.
56
 These findings suggest that the 
Act may have had the unintended consequence of raising the cost of 
capital for EGC firms.
57
 
As to whether the Act achieved its goal of facilitating small firms’ 
ability to raise capital, the early literature is mixed. One study found that 
the Act led to an increase in US IPO volume, with the bulk of that growth 
driven by firms with high disclosure costs—suggesting that the JOBS Act 
achieved its goal of encouraging such firms to go public.
58
 Another study, 
however, suggested that there has not been a general increase in IPO 
growth since the passage of the Act.
59
 
To our knowledge, no previous work has attempted to use the JOBS 
Act to evaluate the relationship between mandatory disclosure and 
individual investor participation. Rather than focusing on the effect of the 
Act on the companies themselves, we focus on the effect of the law on the 
companies’ investor bases. Because the Act reduces the amount of 
information required to be disclosed by federal law at a moment when 
individual investors might most fear that they are at an information deficit 
relative to institutional shareholders—at the IPO stage, when Regulation 
FD does not apply—it offers a unique setting in which to test the effects of 
securities law on different types of investors. In particular, in the Parts that 
follow, we use the Act to study the relationship between mandatory 
disclosure rules and individual investor participation. 
 
 
 54. See Susan Chaplinsky et al., The JOBS Act and the Costs of Going Public (Oct. 4, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492241. 
 55. See id.; see also Mary E. Barth et al., The JOBS Act and Information Uncertainty in IPO 
Firms 4 (Stanford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 14-26, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465927; Sudip Gupta & Ryan D. Israelsen, Hard 
and Soft Information: Firm Disclosure, SEC Letters, and the JOBS Act (Kelley Sch. of Bus., Research 
Paper No. 2014-34, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473509. 
 56. See Barth et al., supra note 55, at 18–20. 
 57. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 12–19 (finding that potential IPO growth was limited 
to two industries, biotech and pharmaceuticals, that have limited immediate growth prospects).  
 58. See Michael Dambra et al., The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence That Disclosure Costs 
Affect the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (2015) (measuring disclosure costs by research 
intensity and industry concentration). 
 59. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 6. 
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B. Descriptive Statistics  
We began by examining each of the registration statements for all firms 
that held their IPO after the JOBS Act went into effect.
60
 There were fifty-
four firms that conducted IPOs from December 8, 2011, through April 5, 
2012 (the period during which the JOBS Act was applied retroactively), 
and 345 firms that conducted an IPO from April 5, 2012 (the day the 
JOBS Act was passed), through April 16, 2014.
61
 We pulled the 
registration statements
62
 from the SEC’s EDGAR database for each of 
these filings and hand-collected data from each firm’s registration 
statement to determine whether the firm utilized any of the modifications 
available under the JOBS Act.
63
  
The descriptive statistics for these companies are provided in Tables I 
and II. Table I indicates that the vast majority of firms that held an IPO 
during the period we study are EGC-eligible—that is, they are permitted 
under the Act to provide less information to investors in advance of their 
IPO than firms that are not EGCs. The table shows the number of firms 
that would have been eligible for EGC status—the firms with less than $1 
billion in revenue in the fiscal year immediately prior to their IPO—
relative to the number of IPOs for each year from January 1, 2007, through 
April 16, 2014. Out of the 941 total IPOs, 829 had less than $1 billion in 
revenue. This indicates that the JOBS Act altered the disclosure rules 
applicable at the IPO stage for the vast majority of firms that go public.  
 
 
 60. We specifically examined all firms that conducted an IPO from December 8, 2011, through 
April 16, 2014. To create this list, we used Thomson Reuters’s SDC database. To obtain accounting 
information, such as the value of each company’s total assets, we merged the data from the Thomas 
Reuters SDC database with the Compustat database. Compustat, which contains financial data for all 
companies listed on US stock exchanges from 1926 through the present, is available through Wharton 
Research Data Services. See WRDS, http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds. 
 61. These data are available from the authors upon request. 
 62. The registration statement is Form S-1 for US firms and Form F-1 for foreign firms. If the 
registration statement was unavailable, we dropped the observation. We also removed all real estate 
investment trusts. 
 63. To determine whether the firm opted out of Section 404, provided fewer years of financial 
data, or provided fewer years of compensation history, we examined each company’s registration 
statement. We began with the original filing, but also reviewed all amendments prior to the IPO date to 
update the original coding as necessary. To identify confidential filers, we searched for the three ways 
a firm can file a confidential registration statement with the SEC. These three options are as follows. 
First, the firm can file a Draft Registration Statement (“DRS”) in EDGAR. Second, companies can 
request confidential treatment by sending an email to the SEC. Third, companies can request 
confidential treatment by sending a request through the mail. 
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TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
   Number Num. IPOs < $1B Percentage 
   of in Revenue in EGC 
   IPOs Prior FY Eligible 
Pre-JOBS 
Act 
Jan. 1, 2007–Dec. 31, 2007 224 202 90% 
Jan. 1, 2008–Dec. 31, 2008 55 48 87% 
Jan. 1, 2009–Dec. 31, 2009 51 43 84% 
Jan. 1, 2010–Dec. 31, 2010 108 97 90% 
Jan. 1, 2011–Dec. 8, 2011 101 94 93% 
JOBS Act 
Retroactive Dec. 9, 2011–Apr. 5, 2012 57 51 89% 
JOBS Act in 
Effect 
Apr. 6, 2012–Dec. 31, 2012 83 70 84% 
Jan. 1, 2013–Dec. 31, 2013 200 167 84% 
Jan. 1, 2014–Apr. 16, 2014 62 57 92% 
 
Total: 941 829 88% 
 
Table II shows that most EGCs took a piecemeal approach in which 
they utilized some, but not all, of the modifications to the IPO process 
available to them. Of the EGCs in our sample, the most popular JOBS Act 
modification—selected by over 95% of our EGC-eligible firms—was the 
option to omit the internal controls report required by Section 404 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. However, many of the other modified disclosures were 
also popular—over 70% of EGCs chose to file their registration statements 
confidentially, and over 40% of firms provided only two years of audited 
financial history. Additionally, roughly 65% provided reduced 
compensation disclosures. 
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TABLE II: DISCLOSURE REDUCTIONS AMONG EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS 
 
 
Total 
EGC-
Eligible 
IPOs 
Number of EGCs Electing Each Modification 
 
Opt Out of 
SOX 
Section 404 
Confidential 
Filing 
Fewer Years of 
Financial History 
Less 
Comp. 
Disclosure 
Apr. 6, 2012 – Dec. 31, 2012 70 65 16 20 36 
Jan. 1, 2013 – Dec. 31, 2013 167 165 139 45 109 
Jan. 1, 2014 – Apr. 16, 2014 57 55 55 30 45 
Total: 294 285 126 95 190 
 
To determine whether the percentage of firms opting for each 
modification varied over time, Figure I charts the percentage of firms 
selecting each option relative to the number of EGC-eligible IPOs per 
month. Panel A shows the total number of IPOs and the number of EGC-
eligible IPOs by month, and Panels B through E show the total number of 
EGC-eligible firms that provided reduced disclosure in each of the four 
areas. 
Although we did not see a time trend in the number of firms that opted 
out of Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley or provided fewer years of 
compensation or financial data, the percentage of eligible firms electing to 
file confidentially increased steadily over our sample period. The average 
percentage of confidential filers was roughly 23% from April through 
December of 2012, and did not exceed 50% in any month during this 
period, but increased to an average of 87% thereafter. This is not 
surprising, however, because many of the firms that held their IPOs in 
2012 had initiated the registration process prior to the passage of the JOBS 
Act, meaning that these firms were required to file a non-confidential 
registration statement. Thus, the firms that held their IPO in 2013 or later 
had greater opportunity to make use of this modification. 
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FIGURE I, PANEL A: IPOS AND EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS BY MONTH 
 
 
FIGURE I, PANEL B: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS FILING CONFIDENTIALLY 
 
 
FIGURE I, PANEL C: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT REDUCE COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE 
  
  
0
10
20
30
40
A
p
r-
1
2
M
ay
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
Ju
l-
1
2
A
u
g
-1
2
S
ep
-1
2
O
ct
-1
2
N
o
v
-1
2
D
ec
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
F
eb
-1
3
M
ar
-1
3
A
p
r-
1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
n
-1
3
Ju
l-
1
3
A
u
g
-1
3
S
ep
-1
3
O
ct
-1
3
N
o
v
-1
3
D
ec
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
F
eb
-1
4
M
ar
-1
4
Number of IPOs Number of EGC-Eligible IPOs
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
A
p
r-
1
2
M
ay
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
Ju
l-
1
2
A
u
g
-1
2
S
ep
-1
2
O
ct
-1
2
N
o
v
-1
2
D
ec
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
F
eb
-1
3
M
ar
-1
3
A
p
r-
1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
n
-1
3
Ju
l-
1
3
A
u
g
-1
3
S
ep
-1
3
O
ct
-1
3
N
o
v
-1
3
D
ec
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
F
eb
-1
4
M
ar
-1
4
A
p
r-
1
4
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
A
p
r-
1
2
M
ay
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
Ju
l-
1
2
A
u
g
-1
2
S
ep
-1
2
O
ct
-1
2
N
o
v
-1
2
D
ec
-1
2
Ja
n
-1
3
F
eb
-1
3
M
ar
-1
3
A
p
r-
1
3
M
ay
-1
3
Ju
n
-1
3
Ju
l-
1
3
A
u
g
-1
3
S
ep
-1
3
O
ct
-1
3
N
o
v
-1
3
D
ec
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
4
F
eb
-1
4
M
ar
-1
4
A
p
r-
1
4
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
312 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:293 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE I, PANEL D: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT PROVIDE FEWER YEARS OF 
FINANCIAL DATA 
 
 
FIGURE I, PANEL E: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT OPT OUT OF SOX SECTION 404 
 
 
C. Key Variables of Interest 
1. Disclosure Index 
The descriptive statistics indicate that most firms selected a piecemeal 
approach in which they opted for some, but not all, of the reduced 
disclosures available to them under the JOBS Act. This allows us to study 
whether the number of reduced disclosures varies cross-sectionally with 
individual trading. If each of the disclosures mandated for non-EGCs 
provides valuable information to individual investors, we would expect 
that individual trading of a particular company would correspondingly 
decrease as the company provides fewer disclosures. To test this 
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possibility, we constructed a firm-level index (the Disclosure Index, or 
“DI”) consisting of the elements below.64 
1. Did the firm provide fewer than three years of audited financial 
statements? EGCs are eligible to provide two (rather than three) 
years of prior audited financial data. 
2. Did the firm opt out of the internal controls report required by 
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley? We consider this provision to be 
disclosure related because the report provides individual investors 
with further detail on the reliability of the audited financials. 
3. Did the firm provide reduced compensation disclosures? EGCs 
may disclose compensation for three (rather than five) executive 
officers, and may elect to report compensation for the last two 
(rather than three) years. We code the firm as providing less 
disclosure if the firm provides either fewer years of data or data for 
fewer executives. 
4. Did the firm file its registration statement confidentially? 
Although confidential filers eventually disclose the same amount of 
information, we consider this provision to be disclosure related 
because it may severely limit the amount of time investors have to 
process the filings in question—a fact that has caused some to argue 
that the modification unfairly discriminates against individual 
investors.
65
  
We sum the reduced number of disclosures taken by each firm to create an 
index ranging from 0 to 4. Firms that provide reduced disclosure in all 
 
 
 64. We note that the elements included in the DI do not reflect the entire set of IPO modifications 
allowed under the JOBS Act. See supra notes 43–49. For the DI, we only included the modifications 
that are most relevant for our purposes—that is, those that most directly reduced information 
communicated to investors.  
 65. Confidential filers must wait a minimum of twenty-one days after their first public filing to 
officially begin their road shows, but critics argue that this is not enough time for individual investors, 
who presumably have other employment, to fully review the final registration statement and the 
attached exhibits. According to one prominent investor, Rett Wallace of Triton Research LLC, “Even 
for professionals, unless you’re narrowly focused, three weeks is not a lot of time. If you’re a retail 
investor and you have a day job, God help you.” Telis Demos, Companies Find a Faster IPO 
Turnaround Doesn’t Hurt, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304795804579101731755248194 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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areas are coded as having a DI of 4, whereas firms that do not take any 
reductions are coded as having a DI of 0.
66
 
2. Measure of Individual Participation 
Empirical study on trading by individual investors has been hampered 
by the lack of available trading data. Because there is no way to determine 
whether every trade placed on every exchange comes from an individual 
or an institution, prior literature has used a number of proxies for trading 
by individual investors. Most studies have used small trade sizes to proxy 
for trades by individuals.
67
 However, while this approach may have been 
accurate historically, it is no longer a valid proxy because institutions now 
use computer algorithms to disguise their trades by breaking them into 
smaller components.
68
 In light of concerns that trade size may not be an 
accurate proxy, some researchers have used individual investor trading 
from brokerage firms.
69
 Although this approach has the advantage of using 
actual trading data rather than a proxy for trading, the disadvantage is that 
the study will usually be limited to evidence from one brokerage firm. 
We instead use actual trading data from the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) to estimate individual investment.
70
 The primary advantage of 
this database is that it contains actual trading data for all investors who 
trade on the NYSE, thus negating the use of proxies and allowing for the 
 
 
 66. Many of these firms took advantage of additional modifications that are available to EGC 
firms but are not disclosure related. We address the concern that our results may be driven by 
modifications to the IPO process rather than the reduced level of disclosure in our Appendix. 
 67. See, e.g., Bushee et al., supra note 4; Miller, supra note 5; see also Nilabhra Bhattacharya, 
Investors’ Trade Size and Trading Responses Around Earnings Announcements: An Empirical 
Investigation, 76 ACCT. REV. 221 (2001); Nilabhra Bhattacharya et al., Who Trades on Pro Forma 
Earnings Information?, 82 ACCT. REV. 581 (2007); Gus De Franco et al., Wealth Transfer Effects of 
Analysts’ Misleading Behavior, 45 J. ACCT. RES. 71 (2007); Charles M.C. Lee, Earnings News and 
Small Traders: An Intraday Analysis, 15 J. ACCT. & ECON. 265 (1992). 
 68. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell et al., Caught on Tape: Institutional Trading, Stock Returns, and 
Earnings Announcements, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 66 (2009) (developing a method for backing out 
algorithmic trades and showing key characteristics of institutional trading behavior). 
 69. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 5. 
 70. Specifically, we use the NYSE ReTrac database. The database is constructed using the NYSE 
Equity Consolidated Audit Trade File, which provides a chronological reconstruction of all stock 
trades that are executed on the NYSE. One of the fields included in the audit trade files, Account Type, 
indicates whether the trade originated from an individual or institution. This field has been included 
since October 1988, when it was included to ensure that trades by individuals received fair treatment 
relative to trades by institutions. It is a mandatory field, and brokers submitting an order on behalf of 
an individual are instructed to note that the order originated from an individual. For other studies using 
these data, see, for example, Ron Kaniel et al., Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns 
Around Earnings Announcements, 67 J. FIN. 639 (2012); Kaniel et al., supra note 20; Wang & Zhang, 
supra note 20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2015] MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS 315 
 
 
 
 
results to be generalized beyond one brokerage house.
71
 The primary 
disadvantage is that these data only include NYSE firms that held IPOs 
through July 2013, which limits our analyses to these observations. To 
measure individual participation, we calculate the percentage of daily 
trading by individuals in each security relative to total trading in that 
security.
72
  
D. Research Design 
To test whether there has been a change in the level of individual 
participation, we needed to compare the firms that provided reduced 
disclosure (the “treatment firms”) with a set of firms that did not modify 
their disclosures (the “control firms”). Following other recent empirical 
studies on the JOBS Act, our control group consisted of firms that held 
IPOs prior to the JOBS Act and would have been eligible for EGC status if 
their IPOs had been completed when the JOBS Act was in effect—that is, 
firms with less than $1 billion in annual revenue in the most recently 
completed fiscal year prior to the IPO.
73
  
Using this control group, our primary empirical design used three 
different analyses to determine whether there was a change in the level of 
individual participation: (1) linear regression, (2) modified propensity 
score matching, and (3) analysis over an extended period of time. The key 
variables of interest were a dummy variable set to 1 if the firm had taken 
advantage of any modification and set to 0 otherwise, and the DI reflecting 
the total number of reduced disclosures taken. All regressions controlled 
for the firm-level characteristics most likely to affect individual 
 
 
 71. Because many individuals trade off-exchange, we use an additional measure of individual 
participation based on non-institutional holdings in the robustness section. Our findings are consistent 
using this additional proxy. 
 72. As in prior literature, such as the IndVolume Ratio defined in Wang and Zhang, supra note 
20, we calculate the absolute individual trading activity (“IT”) relative to the total trading activity 
(“TT”). The IT measure is equal to the total number of shares that were bought and sold by individual 
investors during a particular day, and the TT measure is equal to the total number of shares that were 
bought and sold by all NYSE customers during the initial day of trading. The TT measure is from the 
TAQ database. The TAQ database, which we access through Wharton Research Data Services, 
contains trade-by-trade data for all exchange-listed stocks.  
 73. See Barth et al., supra note 55; Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54; Gupta & Israelsen, supra 
note 55. We note that we began our control sample in 2007 because, although trading by individuals 
decreased significantly at the end of 2006, it remained constant from 2007 through April 2014 (we 
determined this by plotting the percentage of trading by individuals relative to total trading for each 
month from January 2005 through April 2014). 
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investment,
74
 and included fixed effects for the firm’s underwriter and 
industry.
75
 Standard errors were clustered by industry.  
One significant concern with our analysis is that the firms that provided 
less disclosure self-selected to do so. In an ideal experimental setting, the 
treatment and control firms are randomly assigned to each group. When 
firms instead self-select into the treatment group, as in our setting here, 
there is a possibility that the firms have a unique characteristic that causes 
both reduced individual participation and the choice to be a treatment firm. 
We note that two of our analyses address this concern. First, our second 
analysis uses modified propensity score matching (“PSM”) to match the 
treatment and control firms. PSM is a statistical technique that is 
frequently used to address non-random sample selection, and allows us to 
match each firm in the treatment group with the most similar firm in the 
control group. Second, we examined whether the initial reduction in 
individual trading disappeared over time. If the treatment firms do not 
differ from the control sample, we expect that the differences in individual 
trading between the two samples will disappear soon after the IPO 
because, after trading begins, individual investors will have access to more 
sources of information. These other sources of information, such as 
trading history and financial analyst reports, provide additional sources of 
 
 
 74. Following Lawrence, supra note 5, we control for (1) Log(Assets), calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the firm’s total assets in each fiscal year; (2) Book-to-Market, calculated as the book 
value of equity scaled by the market value of equity for the firm in each fiscal year, where the market 
value is calculated as the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding; (3) Return On 
Assets (ROA), calculated as the firm’s net income before extraordinary items divided by the firm’s 
total assets in each fiscal year; (4) Log(Business Segments), the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number 
of the firm’s business segments in each fiscal year; (5) Log(Geographic Segments), the natural 
logarithm of 1 plus the number of the firm’s geographic segments in each fiscal year; and 
(6) Log(Num. Missing Items), the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of missing pieces of 
financial information for the firm in each fiscal year (this is determined as the number of missing items 
in the Compustat database). We also control for the natural logarithm of the firm’s total revenue in the 
most recently completed fiscal year, the firm’s research and development expenses scaled by total 
assets, the firm’s age (we thank Jay R. Ritter for providing founding dates for IPO firms on his 
website), whether the firm is incorporated in the United States or abroad, and whether the firm is in a 
technology industry. We determine whether a firm is in a technology industry in accordance with Tim 
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2004). 
Although these variables are based on Lawrence, supra note 5, we had to omit a limited number of 
controls because of our data and setting. To control for outliers, all control variables were winsorized 
at 1%. 
 75. The firm’s industry is based on the fourty-eight Fama-French industry classifications. For 
detail on the forty-eight industries, see Kenneth R. French, Detail for 48 Industry Portfolios, KENNETH 
R. FRENCH, http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_48_ind_port. 
html (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). Industries are defined as, for example, “Food,” “Transportation,” and 
“Insurance.” Id.  
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information that can reduce information asymmetry between different 
types of investors. 
Finally, we ran a number of additional robustness checks to address 
other concerns with our research design. These tests addressed the 
appropriateness of our control sample, the robustness of our key measure 
of individual investment and trading, and the possibility that individuals 
may be responding to modifications in the IPO process rather than to the 
reduced level of disclosure. These analyses are presented in the Appendix. 
E. Empirical Findings 
1. Linear Regression 
Our first analysis compares the treatment and control firms using 
ordinary least squares regression analysis in which the dependent variable 
is the percentage of total trading that is conducted by individual investors. 
The key variable in column (1) is the dummy variable Modified, which is 
set to 1 if the firm provided reduced disclosure in any area, and 0 
otherwise. The key variable in column (2) is Disclosure Index, which is 
the value of the DI for any particular firm. Throughout all tables, statistical 
significance of 1, 5, and 10 percent is reflected by ***, **, and *, 
respectively, and p-values are reflected in parentheses below the 
regression coefficients. 
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TABLE III: INDIVIDUAL TRADING IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE,  
FIRST DAY 
 (1) (2) 
Modified 
-0.033*** 
 (0.0039) 
 
Disclosure Index 
 
-0.011*** 
 
(0.0002) 
  
Log(Assets) 
0.007 0.007 
(0.324) (0.337) 
Log(Revenue) 
-0.007 -0.007 
(0.432) (0.414) 
Log(Age) 
0.003 0.003 
(0.6373) (0.669) 
Book-to-Market 
0.007 0.008 
(0.69) (0.686) 
Return on Assets 
0.0378*** 0.035*** 
(0.0001) (0.0003) 
Log(Business Segments) 
0.0037 0.0055 
(0.671) (0.517) 
Log(Geographic Segments) 
0.0048 0.005 
(0.65) (0.651) 
Log(Num. Missing Items) 
0.362 0.36 
(0.127) (0.141) 
R&D/Assets 
-0.0087 -0.0134 
(0.922) (0.881) 
Tech 
0.01 0.01 
(0.221) (0.196) 
U.S. Incorp. 
0.0115 0.0112 
(0.32) (0.333) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Underwriter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.3478 0.3379 
Num. Observations 218 218 
 
The results presented in Table III show that the average percentage of 
individual trading was lower for the treatment firms than the control firms. 
Column (1) shows that, as a percentage of total daily trading, individual 
trading was roughly 3.3% lower for the firms that provided reduced 
disclosure. Column (2) examines the cross-sectional variation in the 
number of reductions in disclosure taken by each firm and shows that the 
decrease in individual trading volume is additive. On average, individual 
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trading relative to total trades decreases by an additional 1.1% for each 
additional reduction in disclosure (that is, for each additional increase in 
the firm’s DI). This suggests that all the disclosures are relevant to 
investors. 
2. Modified Propensity Score Matching 
In our next analysis, we used PSM to address the possibility that the 
firms that self-selected to provide fewer disclosures differed systematically 
from the control sample. PSM uses observable characteristics, such as a 
firm’s country of incorporation or total assets, to match each treatment 
firm to the most similarly situated control firm. Although the match is 
performed along observable characteristics, the firms will theoretically be 
similar along unobservable characteristics as well.  
To create a PSM sample, the first step is to determine the variables that 
predict the treatment (i.e., to determine which variables predict that a firm 
will provide reduced disclosure). In this first step, we found that very few 
observable characteristics were able to predict, at standard levels of 
statistical significance, whether the firm would be treated.
76
 On the one 
hand, the fact that few firm characteristics appeared to be related to the 
decision to provide reduced disclosure suggests that there may be little 
self-selection bias. On the other hand, because our statistical tests have 
only limited power in predicting whether a firm will be treated, a question 
remains as to whether the matched sample that is created based on these 
tests addresses any unobserved differences. 
Table IV compares the treatment firms with the matched sample.
77
 The 
table shows that, although the control variables do not differ significantly 
between the treatment and control samples, individual investors are less 
likely to trade in the firms that provide less disclosure.   
 
 
 76. There are minor differences in the modified filers and control sample. Most notably, the 
modified filers appear to have fewer business and geographic segments, fewer missing pieces of 
financial information in the current fiscal year, and much greater research and development expenses 
relative to assets. 
 77. We matched the treatment and control firms based on their propensity score, provided that 
both firms were in the same Fama-French industry and had the same incorporation status (foreign or 
domestic). 
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TABLE IV: PROPENSITY-SCORE-MATCHED CONTROL AND TREATMENT FIRMS 
  Propensity Score Treatment Difference Difference 
  Matched Sample Sample in  in  
  (N=42) (N=42) Means Medians 
  Mean Median Mean Median p-value p-value 
Log(Assets) 5.986 5.763 6.018 5.806 0.903 0.42 
Log(Revenue) 5.266 4.929 5.349 5.477 0.694 0.187 
Log(Age) 1.93 2.197 2.217 2.197 0.178 0.402 
Book-to-Market 0.382 0.325 0.478 0.256 0.481 0.297 
ROA -0.019 0.014 0.019 0.012 0.774 0.236 
Log(Business 
Segments) 0.814 0.693 0.771 0.693 0.618 0.251 
Log(Geographic 
Segments) 0.859 0.693 0.819 0.896 0.793 0.491 
Log(Number 
Missing Items) 6.403 6.389 6.406 6.397 0.803 0.338 
R&D/Assets 0.062 0.009 0.069 0.000 0.727 0.453 
Individual Trading 0.051 0.0294 0.0201 0.0165 0.005*** 0.018** 
 
Specifically, the mean difference in individual trading for the treatment 
firms is roughly 3% lower than the mean for the matched control firms. 
The difference is statistically significant at 1%. Similarly, the median 
difference for the treatment sample is roughly 1.5% lower than the control 
sample, and the difference is statistically significant at 5%. The findings 
are thus both economically and statistically significant. 
3. Analysis Beyond the First Day of Trading 
The prior analyses showed that the firms that provided less disclosure 
had lower individual participation on their first day of trading.
78
 From a 
policy perspective, however, we might wonder whether there are long-
term differences. If, as theoretical literature predicts, uninformed investors 
are less likely to invest when they perceive information asymmetry to be 
higher,
79
 the effect is likely to disappear over time. Compared with the 
vast sources of information that become available after a firm is public, 
such as a firm’s stock price and reports from financial analysts, the 
reduced disclosures allowed by the JOBS Act seem relatively minor. As 
such, even if individuals feel disadvantaged on the first day of trading, 
when information asymmetry is likely to be the strongest, the effect may 
be short-lived. 
 
 
 78. See supra Part II.E. 
 79. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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To test whether the result persists over an extended time period, Table 
V presents a series of linear regressions in which the dependent variable is 
individual trading behavior on the initial day of trading as well as seven, 
fourteen, twenty-one, sixty, and ninety days following the IPO. The key 
variables of interest in Panels A and B are the Modified and Disclosure 
Index variables, respectively.  
TABLE V, PANEL A: INDIVIDUAL TRADING IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE  
 
1st Day 7th Day 
14th 
Day 21st Day 60th Day 90th Day 
Modified 
-0.036*** -0.068** 0.0245 0.041 0.01 0.006 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.767) (0.632) (0.904) (0.839) 
              
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & 
Underwriter Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
R-squared 0.3787 0.5006 0.3573 0.4569 0.3938 0.4221 
Num. Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
TABLE V, PANEL B: INDIVIDUAL TRADING IN FIRMS WITH REDUCED DISCLOSURE  
  1st Day 7th Day 14th Day 21st Day 60th Day 90th Day 
Disclosure Index 
-0.018*** -0.019** -0.0095 -0.005 0.0076 -0.0087 
(0.0002) (0.047) (0.609) (0.67) (0.40) (0.393) 
       Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & 
Underwriter Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
R-squared 0.3677 0.4812 0.3481 0.402 0.3837 0.3562 
Num. Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 
 
The results show that the statistical significance associated with our 
variables of interest decreased in the days following the IPO. Although all 
results were statistically significant on the initial day of trading and 
remained significant seven days following the IPO, statistical significance 
disappeared for both the Modified and Disclosure Index variables fourteen 
days after the IPO, indicating that trading by individual investors was not 
statistically different than expected two weeks after the firm’s IPO.  
From the perspective of our research design, the finding provides us 
with confidence that our results are not caused by a self-selection bias 
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related to the firms that select to provide less disclosure. Although 
individual investors were less likely to trade in these filers immediately 
following the IPO, they were not generally less likely to trade in these 
specific firms. This suggests that there is no unique feature about these 
firms that made them unappealing to individuals, helping to alleviate 
concerns that our results are driven by an unobservable characteristic that 
causes the firms to be unappealing to individual investors and to provide 
reduced disclosure. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND COMMENTATORS  
As noted in Part I, federal securities regulators are now engaged in a 
vociferous debate over the optimal design of securities disclosure—and 
the effects of that design on individual investor participation in modern 
stock markets. Using the unique setting provided by the JOBS Act, we 
have shown that reducing the quantum of information mandated by 
securities law does indeed reduce individual investors’ participation at the 
IPO stage—but that this reduction disappears after just two weeks of 
trading. 
These findings have significant implications for regulators now 
considering what changes, if any, to make to the mandatory disclosure 
rules that comprise much of US securities law. In particular, our evidence 
indicates that reducing the quantum of mandated disclosure at the IPO 
stage—when individual investors are most likely to be sensitive to the risk 
that large institutions are better-informed, and when complementary law 
such as Regulation FD does not apply—raises the most acute concerns 
related to individual investor participation. Thus, our evidence suggests 
that—to the extent that securities regulators remain focused on individual 
investors—there is a stronger case for changes to the mandatory disclosure 
regime that applies to public companies after the IPO stage than before. 
Second, our evidence suggests that lawmakers interested in 
understanding the causal effects of changes to securities law on individual 
investors should pursue more clearly identified experimental approaches 
to future changes in the law. The JOBS Act worked a significant change to 
the law of going public, providing an exceptional setting for studying the 
effects of those changes. Notwithstanding our best efforts, however, as 
noted above the nature of the change in the law makes it difficult to draw 
clear causal inferences. Thus, lawmakers would do well to learn from the 
limits of our study—as well as from its findings—in designing any future 
changes to the law of mandatory disclosure. 
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A. Mandatory Disclosure at the IPO Stage 
To the extent that securities regulators are concerned about individual 
investor participation in securities markets, our findings suggest that the 
case for reducing disclosure mandates is weakest at the IPO stage, where 
such investors are likely to be most sensitive to the informational effects 
of reduced disclosures. Instead, for the reasons given below, lawmakers 
seeking to reduce mandatory disclosure burdens might focus their efforts 
after, rather than before, the IPO stage. 
 First, as a matter of both theory and evidence, individual investors are 
likely to react far more strongly to a reduction in the quantum of 
information required to be disclosed before the IPO stage than after. As to 
theory, as noted in Part I, a significant benefit of mandatory disclosure for 
individual investors is that such disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
among classes of investors—or, in policy parlance, “levels the playing 
field”—between individual and institutional investors. This asymmetry is 
greatest at the IPO stage, when individual investors fear that the IPO 
process has given the firm opportunities to convey nonpublic information 
to institutional investors. Moreover, Regulation FD, which complements 
mandatory disclosure rules with respect to information asymmetry among 
investor classes,
80
 does not apply before the IPO stage. Thus, as a matter 
of theory, reducing mandatory disclosure burdens at the IPO stage is far 
more likely to result in a corresponding reduction in individual investor 
participation than doing so after the IPO stage.
81
 
 As to evidence, we have shown in this Article that, in fact, reductions 
in pre-IPO disclosure under the JOBS Act led to economically and 
statistically significantly lower individual investor participation in IPOs. 
Thus, whatever the benefits of the JOBS Act, for lawmakers concerned 
about individual investor participation, the Act came with the cost of 
reducing individuals’ participation in initial public offerings. We have also 
shown, however, that once these companies became public—and more 
information about the firms became publicly available—this effect 
disappeared. This finding suggests that reductions in mandated disclosures 
 
 
 80. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
 81. We acknowledge, of course, that the number of shareholders affected by changes to the 
mandatory disclosure rules that apply after the IPO is likely to be significantly greater than the number 
of investors affected by changes to rules that apply before the IPO stage. We argue only that the 
marginal effect of such changes is likely to be greater for individual investors at the IPO stage than for 
firms that are already public, because investors can use alternative sources of information to assess 
already-public companies that are not available for firms before an IPO. 
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for post-IPO firms could have a much less pronounced effect on individual 
investor participation in markets for those companies’ stocks.  
 We note, of course, that policymakers’ motivations for choosing the 
pre-IPO stage for reductions in mandatory disclosure requirements likely 
had little to do with the effects of those changes on individual investor 
participation. Instead, those lawmakers cited a reduction in the costs of 
going public for relatively small businesses—where these costs are often a 
substantial fraction of the firm’s budgets—as the basis for their choice to 
focus on the pre-IPO disclosure regime.
82
 We note, however, that the early 
evidence on whether the JOBS Act actually reduced those costs is rather 
mixed.
83
 We also note that these costs can also be substantial on an 
ongoing basis for small businesses that completed their IPO long before 
the JOBS Act became law.
84
 
 Morever, while we certainly understand the political appeal of 
reducing disclosure costs for firms that may soon go public,
85
 the evidence 
we have presented in this Article suggests that lawmakers concerned about 
individual investors should proceed with caution in this respect. By 
reducing individual investors’ participation in IPOs, the JOBS Act risks 
creating the perception that the outsized returns occasionally available in 
new issues are reserved only for large institutional shareholders. We do 
not suggest that such a perception would be well-grounded in empirical 
evidence—only that this perception might carry significant political 
implications of its own. For lawmakers convinced that basic conceptions 
 
 
 82. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 83. See generally Chaplinksy et al., supra note 54. 
 84. See IPO TASK FORCE, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: 
PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 9 (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf (estimating $2.5 million in 
costs for the IPO process and another $1.5 million in annual ongoing compliance costs of staying 
public); see also Carlos Berdejó, Going Public After the JOBS Act, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (2015) 
(noting that the trend of decline in the number of private companies conducting IPOs “has been more 
pronounced for small companies, reflecting the quasi-fixed nature of [regulatory] compliance costs, 
which disproportionally burden smaller and younger issuers”). We acknowledge, of course, that some 
disclosures will involve more “quasi-fixed” compliance costs than others. For example, a firm that 
complies with SOX Section 404 at the IPO stage will have to implement the relevant infrastructure and 
procedures at that point, incurring a substantial amount of such costs. Disclosures related to 
governance or business decisions, on the other hand, typically involve fewer costs of this kind. 
 85. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama to 
Sign Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act (Apr. 5, 2012), available at https://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act 
(“The JOBS Act makes it easier for young, high-growth firms to go public by providing an incubator 
period for a new class of ‘Emerging Growth Companies.’ During this period, qualifying companies 
will have time to reach compliance with certain public company disclosure and auditing requirements 
after their [IPO].”). 
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of fairness—or, more simply, sound politics—demand that individual 
investors not be discouraged from participating in modern stock markets, 
reducing the disclosure burdens that apply before an IPO may well be 
more politically costly than making changes to the rules that apply after an 
IPO. 
 For all of these reasons, our evidence suggests that policymakers 
concerned about individual investor participation would do well to focus 
future changes to the mandatory disclosure regime on disclosures 
occurring after the IPO stage rather than before the company goes public. 
As a matter of theory, changes to disclosure rules after the IPO stage are 
less likely to reduce individual investor participation. As a matter of 
empirical evidence, our results are consistent with that intuition. And as a 
matter of political economy, such changes may allow lawmakers to 
capture the benefits of reduced disclosure burdens without suffering the 
corresponding costs related to reduced levels of individual investor 
participation in securities markets.
86 
 
B. Experimental Design and Changes to Mandatory Disclosure Law 
Our evidence also suggests that, to the extent lawmakers do pursue 
further changes to mandatory disclosure rules, they should do so in a 
fashion that enables researchers to evaluate the effects of those changes on 
the many groups of investors the SEC is charged with protecting.
87
 In this 
respect, we join those scholars who have urged lawmakers to pursue 
experimental regulatory changes that would allow researchers to more 
clearly attribute causal effects of those changes for investors.
88
 
As noted in Part I, the passage of the JOBS Act worked a significant 
change in the disclosure rules that govern IPOs in the United States—a 
significant category of transactions with broad importance for investors 
and entrepreneurs alike. But identifying the causal effects of that change is 
 
 
 86. We note that, consistent with this argument, the SEC’s extensive recent concept release on 
modernizing public-company disclosures emphasizes changes to rules that apply after the IPO rather 
than before. See Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 
supra note 5, at 6 (“We focus this release on business and financial disclosures that registrants provide 
in their periodic reports . . . .”). 
 87. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last 
modified June 10, 2013) (“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States 
derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment . . . .”). 
 88. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Knowledge Problem (Harvard 
Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 800, 2014), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Sunstein_800.pdf. 
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elusive because the fashion in which the law was changed does not permit 
clean causal inference.
89
 We have attempted to address this gap through 
standard techniques in settings like these, but the limits of those 
techniques are nontrivial. Like us, other researchers have attempted to 
identify the causal implications of the JOBS Act for companies and 
investors in other contexts. And, like us, these researchers have been 
forced by the setting in which the Act became law to qualify the causal 
implications of their findings.
90
 
We understand, of course, that a wide range of practical considerations 
limit regulators’ freedom to make changes to longstanding law in a fashion 
that permits researchers to draw causal inference.
91
 But we note that 
federal securities regulators are among the few lawmakers who have 
executed randomized trials of the kind that would permit such inferences.
92
 
As regulators consider whether to extend the JOBS Act’s disclosure-
reduction reforms to other areas, we urge them to do so in a manner that 
would permit clearer causal inference than is possible in the JOBS Act 
setting. Such an approach would allow the SEC to assess more carefully 
the effects of changing mandatory disclosure rules on the investors that it 
is required by law to protect. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A common justification for the mandatory disclosure rules that serve as 
the bedrock of federal securities law is that such rules encourage 
individual investors to participate in stock markets. Although the 
desirability of individual investor participation in these markets has been 
hotly debated, the Nation’s top securities regulators have repeatedly made 
clear that facilitating such participation is among their policy goals. Thus, 
whether mandatory disclosure rules do, in fact, encourage individuals to 
invest in stock markets remains a pressing question for lawmakers. 
 
 
 89. See, e.g., supra notes 75–77 (discussing selection effects necessarily associated with a study 
in this setting, and attempting to address them through PSM).  
 90. See, e.g., Barth et al., supra note 55, at 24 (noting that consistency of results between linear-
regression tests and PSM “increase[s] [the authors’] confidence that the differences [they observe] are 
attributable to the JOBS Act”). 
 91. For an explanation of some of these limitations—and how they might be overcome—see 
Sunstein, supra note 88, at 14–16. 
 92.  The SEC famously pursued a natural-experiment approach to its implementation of 
Regulation SHO, yielding research that could meaningfully evaluate the causal effects of stock market 
dynamics on managerial choices. See, e.g., Yinghua Li & Liandong Zhang, Short Selling Pressure, 
Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 53 
J. ACCT. RES. 79 (2015). 
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Empirical study of that question has been elusive, however, because few 
settings allow researchers to examine the relationship between the scope of 
mandatory disclosure rules and individuals’ participation in the stock 
market.  
In this Article, we have provided rare empirical evidence on this 
question by using the JOBS Act to study how individual investors respond 
to specific reductions in mandated disclosures. Our results show that 
individuals participate less in IPOs involving companies that provide 
reduced disclosure—a finding consistent with the view that broader 
disclosure mandates encourage small investors to participate in stock 
markets. However, our results also show that the decrease in individual 
trading disappears two weeks after a firm’s IPO. This latter finding 
suggests that there may be an effective economic substitute for the 
information provided by mandatory disclosures: information provided by 
the markets themselves when a firm’s shares are publicly traded. 
These findings have important implications for regulators now 
considering whether and how to change the disclosure obligations that 
public companies face under federal law. In particular, they suggest that 
changes to these mandates after the IPO are likely to have far fewer effects 
on individual investor participation than the changes imposed by the JOBS 
Act. To the extent that lawmakers are concerned about such participation, 
then, they would do well to focus on firms that are already public. In 
particular, regulators could first focus those efforts on public companies 
with significant alternative sources of information about the firm—sources 
that could substitute for securities disclosures. But however the SEC 
proceeds, it is critical that it does so in a fashion that will permit observers 
to identify the effects of any regulatory changes on the investors that the 
Commission is required by law to protect.  
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APPENDIX 
This appendix presents a number of robustness tests designed to 
address concerns with the research design in our primary analysis. First, 
because our control sample includes firms that went public prior to the 
JOBS Act, we address the concern that our results were driven by 
differences in individual trading or in the types of firms that held their 
IPOs in the periods before and after the JOBS Act, rather than by the 
reduced disclosures provided by EGCs. Second, we address the possibility 
that our results were driven by the construction of our measure of 
individual participation. Third, we address the concern that our results 
were driven by modifications to the IPO process rather than by reductions 
in disclosure. 
I. SUITABILITY OF CONTROL SAMPLE 
Our first set of robustness tests addressed several potential concerns 
regarding our control sample. First, there could have been a difference in 
trading by individual investors before and after the JOBS Act that was 
completely unrelated to any changes in disclosure requirements. For 
example, if individual investors were just generally less likely to trade 
following the JOBS Act, this structural change could have driven our 
findings. Second, there could have been a difference in the type of 
companies that went public following the passage of the JOBS Act. The 
JOBS Act was meant to lower the cost of raising capital, so its passage 
might have encouraged a different type of company to go public. If so, 
individuals may not have been interested in these new companies going 
public. 
A. Changes in Individual Participation 
We first addressed the possibility that, for reasons completely unrelated 
to changes in disclosure, individual trading differed before and after the 
JOBS Act. To rule out this possibility, we utilized the firms that provided 
full disclosure even though they were EGC-eligible. Barring a structural 
difference in individual trading across years, there should be no difference 
between these firms and the firms used for the control sample. 
Table VI shows the results of linear regression analysis comparing 
these non-modified, EGC-eligible filers with the control sample. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of total trading that is conducted by 
individual investors, and the key variable of interest in this analysis is the 
dummy variable Post, which is set to 1 for those firms that were EGC-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/8
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eligible but did not modify their disclosures and to 0 for all control firms. 
The regression includes all control variables used in the primary 
analysis.
93
 As before, standard errors are clustered by industry, and p-
values are reflected in parentheses below the regression coefficients. 
TABLE VI: ROBUSTNESS TEST: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT DID NOT REDUCE 
DISCLOSURE 
   (1)  (2) 
Post 
-0.0013 -0.011 
(0.903) (0.408) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
 
    
R-squared 0.39 0.3597 
Num. Observations 189 213 
 
The results show that individual trading for the non-modified filers and 
the pre-JOBS Act control sample did not differ significantly. Column (1) 
includes only those firms that held an IPO following April 5, 2012, and 
did not modify their disclosures, and column (2) includes all those firms 
that held an IPO following December 8, 2011, and did not modify their 
disclosures (i.e., column (2) includes the firms to which the JOBS Act 
applied retroactively). The lack of statistical significance indicates that our 
results are not driven by a structural change in individual trading before 
and after the JOBS Act. 
B. Structural Changes in the US IPO Market 
We next consider whether our results were driven by a structural 
change in the US IPO market. We analyzed this proposition from two 
angles. First, we replaced the control sample used in our primary 
analysis—firms that went public prior to the JOBS Act—with EGC-
eligible firms that did not reduce disclosure in any areas. Second, we 
checked whether US exchanges have gained market share following the 
JOBS Act.  
 
 
 93. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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1. Alternative Control Sample 
Table VII shows the results when we replaced the firms in our original 
control sample with the non-modified filers that were EGC-eligible. 
Assuming that these non-modified filers were similar to the pre-JOBS Act 
control firms, we expected to find that these results are roughly consistent 
with the results of the linear regression shown in Table III.
94
  
TABLE VII: ROBUSTNESS TEST: EGC-ELIGIBLE FIRMS THAT DID NOT REDUCE 
DISCLOSURE AS CONTROL 
 
Panel A Panel B 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Modified  -0.0116**   -0.0119***   
  (0.018)   (0.000)   
Index   -0.0045**   -0.0067*** 
    (0.036)   (0.001) 
 
        
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry & Underwriter Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
        
R-squared 0.3204 0.3219 0.2737 0.2786 
Num. Observations 66 66 90 90 
 
Indeed, we found that our key results are consistent using these 
alternative control groups. As in the prior table, the key variable in column 
(1) is Modified, and the key variable in column (2) is Disclosure Index. 
The sample in Panel A includes all non-modified, EGC-eligible firms that 
held an IPO following April 5, 2012, and the sample in Panel B includes 
all non-modified, EGC-eligible firms that held an IPO following 
December 8, 2011. Because our findings are consistent when our control 
group consists of firms that held an IPO during the same time period as the 
treatment firms, we do not believe that our results were driven by a 
structural change in the US IPO market.    
 
 
 94. With the exception of the control sample, all methodology is the same as that used in Table 
III. 
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2. Relative Market Share of US Exchanges 
Because we consider the London Stock Exchange (“LSE”) to be the 
closest competitor to US stock exchanges, we checked whether the US 
exchanges have gained market share relative to the LSE since the passage 
of the JOBS Act. Using the total number of foreign IPOs on US exchanges 
and the LSE as the denominator, and the number of foreign IPOs on US 
exchanges as the numerator, we checked whether there was an increase in 
the percentage of foreign firms that held an IPO on a US exchange rather 
than the LSE following the passage of the JOBS Act. If so, this could 
indicate a change in the composition of IPO firms, suggesting that the 
firms holding their IPOs after the JOBS Act may not be comparable to 
those that held their IPO before the Act. 
We found that the percentage was relatively constant, suggesting that 
US exchanges did not gain market share relative to the LSE. While this is 
a very broad analysis, we note that prior literature also has not found a 
general increase in US IPO volume.
95
 Overall, the combination of tests 
provides us with confidence that our results are not driven by a change in 
the type of firms that went public following the passage of the JOBS Act. 
II. ALTERNATE MEASURES OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT 
Trading by individual investors is notoriously difficult to estimate, and 
we had two potential concerns with our measure of individual trading. 
First, the NYSE database containing the level of individual trading is 
restricted to trades in equities listed on the NYSE; it omits trades that 
occurred off-exchange or on other platforms. Second, because our measure 
of individual trading was scaled by the total number of shares traded by 
NYSE customers, our findings could have been driven by the denominator 
rather than the numerator. 
A. Non-Institutional Holdings from 13F Filings 
Because our primary database captures only those individuals trading 
on the NYSE, we supplemented our analysis with an additional proxy: the 
level of non-institutional holdings based on Form 13F filings. Institutional 
 
 
 95. See Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54, at 33 (“Our finding that total IPO volume has not 
increased after the Act is consistent with earlier noted studies . . . .”); see also Dambra et al., supra 
note 58, at 126–34 (finding a slight increase in IPO volume, but that the increase was driven by firms 
with high proprietary disclosure costs rather than general growth of all firms). 
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investors who exercise discretion over $100 million or more of qualifying 
assets are required to file Form 13F within forty-five days of the end of 
each calendar quarter.
96
 In order to calculate the percentage of non-
institutional holdings for each stock, we subtracted the total institutional 
holdings from the total shares outstanding.
97
 We then scaled the level of 
non-institutional holdings by total shares outstanding to get a percentage. 
Using this broader proxy of non-institutional ownership, we replicated the 
analyses presented in Table III. The results are reported in Table VIII.
98
 
TABLE VIII: ROBUSTNESS TEST: NON-INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS 
  
Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Modified 
-0.060**   
(0.004)   
Index 
  -0.017** 
  (0.022) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
      
R-squared 0.3278 0.326 
Num. Observations 829 829 
 
The magnitude using the 13F filings was far greater than that reported 
using the NYSE data, but the results from the two measures consistently 
showed that individual investors were less likely to participate in firms 
with reduced disclosures. We note, however, that the larger magnitude 
associated with the 13F filings is not unexpected. First, the percentage of 
non-institutional holdings includes both institutional investors that were 
too small to file a 13F and individual investors, so it is far more inclusive 
than the NYSE dataset. Second, the NYSE data report trading, whereas the 
13F filings report holdings. Individual investors are thought to hold shares 
for a much longer duration than institutional investors,
99
 so we expect 
 
 
 96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(1) (2014). 
 97. For this calculation, we only include common stock, and we clean the data following 
Campbell et al., supra note 68, at 69–71. 
 98. In an untabulated analysis, we also replicate Table IV by using the propensity score analysis 
presented in Table III to create a matched sample. When we compare the percentage of non-
institutional holdings across the matched and control samples, the results are consistent with our earlier 
findings, and are therefore statistically significant. 
 99. Compare Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odeon, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The 
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000) (finding that the 
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individuals to have a relatively higher holdings-to-trading ratio at the end 
of each fiscal quarter.  
B. Alternate Scalar for NYSE Data 
The second robustness check related to our measure of individual 
trading addressed the concern that our findings were caused by a scalar 
effect. Because the deflator in our primary analysis is the total volume 
traded on the NYSE, it is possible that differences in the total volume 
traded before and after the JOBS Act may be driving our findings. To 
address this possibility, we deflated total individual investment at the end 
of the day by total common shares outstanding rather than total trading 
volume, and replicated all the estimations in Tables III–VIII using this 
alternative measure. Although statistical significance decreased in some 
estimations, the results presented in our original analyses were all 
directionally consistent and maintained statistical significance at 10% or 
better. For concision, these results are not tabulated. 
III. MODIFICATIONS THAT WERE NOT DISCLOSURE RELATED 
The JOBS Act allows EGCs to make a number of modifications to the 
IPO process, some of which are not disclosure related, so it is possible that 
individual investors responded to the modifications in the IPO process 
rather than to the reduced level of disclosure. Other literature on the JOBS 
Act, which has generally considered all major modifications rather than 
only those that are disclosure related, has found that these non-disclosure 
modifications are related to an increase in indirect IPO costs.
100
 However, 
while these modifications may affect other outcomes, they do not provide 
investors with less information. Thus, we did not expect them to be related 
to individual participation, so we expected the inclusion of these items to 
lessen the statistical and economic significance of the DI. 
The two additional modifications we considered were the following: 
(1) did the filer elect to freeze the generally accepted accounting principles 
(“GAAP”) in use at the time of the IPO?; and (2) did the firm opt out of 
 
 
annual turnover rate at a US-based brokerage firm is roughly 75% annually, which suggests that 
individuals have an average holding period of sixteen months), with BEN W. HEINEMAN, JR. & 
STEPHEN DAVIS, YALE SCH. OF MGMT., ARE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS PART OF THE PROBLEM OR 
PART OF THE SOLUTION? KEY DESCRIPTIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT SHAREHOLDERS’ 
ROLE IN U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS 9 (2011) (reporting that in 2009, equity-based mutual funds, a 
common type of institutional investor, had an average holding period of less than eleven months). 
 100. See Barth et al., supra note 55; see also Chaplinsky et al., supra note 54. 
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the Say-on-Pay and Say-on-Frequency provisions required by federal 
law?
101
 If the filer elected to freeze GAAP, it would not have to comply 
with changes to GAAP unless the changes also applied to nonpublic 
companies. If the filer elected out of the Say-on-Pay and Say-on-
Frequency provisions, the filer would not have to allow the shareholders to 
vote on executive compensation.  
Although we would have liked to test these modifications individually, 
we were unable to do so because there is substantial overlap between the 
firms that elected to use these modifications and the firms that provided 
reduced disclosures. Instead, we added these modifications to the DI to 
create a Modified Disclosure Index, so that the Modified Disclosure Index 
included all six modifications rather than only the four disclosure 
provisions. We then replicated the analysis described in Table III using 
this Modified Disclosure Index. 
TABLE IX: ROBUSTNESS TEST: TOTAL MODIFICATIONS 
 
Model 
(1) 
Model  
(2) 
Disclosure Index 
 -0.011***    
(0.000)   
Modified Index 
   -0.00357*  
  (0.007) 
Control Variables Yes Yes 
Industry & Underwriter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
      
R-squared 0.3379 0.3381 
Num. Observations 218 218 
   
 
The results presented in Table IX show that the economic and 
statistical significance of our original findings were reduced when these 
additional variables were included. This finding, which is consistent with 
the conclusion that inclusion of these non-disclosure modifications 
“waters down” the predictive power of our original DI, suggests that 
individual investors responded to the reduced disclosure specifically rather 
than the overall number of modifications. 
 
 
 101. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
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